identity. It is also assumed that the EU's political strategy currently being pursued, consisting in relinquishing the prospect of EU enlargement towards the east to include selected countries of the so-called post-Soviet area, contributes to strengthening "the fracture" of East-Central Europe. Th is is apparently the result of the European Union's implementation of "A Europe of Projects" strategy, which is the measures undertaken under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, or Back Sea Synergy.
In the context of the foregoing research assumptions, the starting point for the investigations and for verifi cation of the adopted research hypotheses will be to defi ne the geographical (even if disputable) boundaries of East-Central Europe. Next, bearing in mind the abovementioned multifaceted construction of social space in East-Central Europe, the subject of analysis will be the specifi city of political empowerment in this part of Europe and its limitation, and, subsequently, the specifi city of the sociopolitical situation and the specifi city of the problem of cultural identity will be examined. Th e defi ned research area poses methodological challenges. Th e question arises how to investigate such markedly qualitative phenomena as the political empowerment of society and the functioning of civil society, or cultural identity, but also the socio-economic situation? It is assumed that while investigating the state of development of civil society and the level of its political empowerment, the current socioeconomic situation, and while verifying the "fracture" of East-Central Europe at those two levels, the quantitative analysis of selected indicators will be useful, for example the number of non-governmental organizations per million inhabitants, the press freedom index, Democracy Index, Human Development Index (HDI), Gross National Income (GNI), Gender Inequality Index (GII), and Human Poverty Index (HPI). When analyzing the specifi city of cultural identity, factor analysis was used in the form of identifi cation of three variables restricting the possibility of emergence of a separate East-Central-European identity.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL RANGE OF EASTCENTRAL EUROPE AS A SOCIAL SPACE*
It is self-evident to say that the geographical environment, its physical properties, is a space where social, economic, political and cultural processes function. What is more, with the thesis about geographical determinism not being accepted, this environment can be a variable that determines social processes. Nevertheless, with regard to East-Central Europe, it is fi rst of all specifi c social processes, however disputable this may seem, what has made it geographically distinct rather than a separate geographical character having formed it as a coherent socio-economic and cultural space. Consequently, regardless of the defi ned geographical range of East-Central Europe, the process of its "fracturing" as a distinct social space is taking place. In other words, a coherent social space is not functioning in the emergent geographical space.
Th e geographical range of the area called East-Central Europe, still the subject of dispute and controversy, is not explicitly and exactly defi ned, although Jerzy Kłoczowski argues that the concept "East-Central Europe" has been accepted by various historical schools. 1 An important contribution to thinking about this area and its identifi cation was made by Oskar Halecki. His term "East-Central Europe" was to render the specifi c and distinct character of the eastern part of Central Europe as culturally and historically diff erent from the western part of Central Europe, which is formed by the uniform German speaking area. In this context, EastCentral Europe is, in Halecki's view, the area between Sweden, Germany and Italy on the one side, and Turkey and Russia on the other. 2 of Both Nations and historical Kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary. He locates the following countries in the area: Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, and a large part of Romania. 6 Th e foregoing defi nitions of the East-Central European area generally agree that this is a space between Germany and Russia. Th ere are controversies mainly over the boundaries of this area along the North-South axis. It appears that Paul Magocsi's inclusion of Greece and the European part of Turkey in the south in East-Central Europe is not justifi ed. Th e fewest controversies seem to be provoked by Oskar Halecki's attempt to determine the East-Central European area, and by the attempts to identify the countries located in this area by Columbia University's East-Central European Center. In the last case, it may be disputable, given historical experience, cultural traditions, and political standards, to locate Austria in this area, whereas it is necessary to include Kosovo.
THE SPECIFICITY OF POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THE SOCIAL SPACE OF EASTCENTRAL EUROPE
A signifi cant element in the analysis of the specifi city of social space in East-Central Europe and the "fracture" in this space is the political empowerment of societies. Th e adopted defi nition describes it as the capacity of individuals and organized social groups to behave consciously in order to realize their own interests by exerting infl uence on political power centers. It can take the form of formal powers and its actual realization. 7 Th e object of analysis will be the actual functioning of political empowerment of societies in East-Central Europe and the existing divisions in this fi eld. An essential problem, however, is to defi ne the criteria for measuring the political empowerment of society and the elements of its analysis. A necessary condition for this is the existence of civil society.
It is also necessary to take into account the factors that determine its functioning.
Civil society is a value but fi rst of all a dynamic process of its functioning in a specifi c reality. Regardless of diff erences in its interpretation and its ideologization 8 , it was already identifi ed in ancient times with the freedom of the people and their involvement in political activity. 9 It was interpreted as the opposite of political power and located between family and the state 10 , and consequently it emphasized the political empowerment of individuals and social groups. With regard to East-Central Europe, the object of analysis will be the way civil society was organised, but also the conditions for its functioning, taking the existing restrictions into consideration. A view should be accepted that civil society cannot be confi ned to the activities of non-governmental organizations. 11 Th is opinion in no way changes the fact, however, that the latter are an important element of building the empowerment of society. An essential element in the analysis of political empowerment of societies in East-Central Europe and of the consequent divisions is the conditions for utilizing this empowerment. Signifi cant variables that determine them are the freedom of the press and the general democratic level of a political system measured with the Democracy Index, and restrictions on human rights in the group of political freedoms, the so-called fi rst generation.
Regardless of the acceptance of the earlier view that the existence of non-governmental organizations does not exhaust the complexity of the phenomenon of civil society, they are an indispensable element of its empowerment, activity, and infl uence on the decision-making processes in a political system. Th e force of this infl uence is a separate problem. It has been assumed that one of the criteria (albeit imperfect) for the development of civil society and its empowerment is the number of nongov- Statistical data on the level of development of civil society measured by the number of nongovernmental organizations per one million inhabitants clearly show that the dividing line runs fi rst of all between the EastCentral European countries that are EU members and those that are not (see Table 1 ). 12 In each of the EU member states located in the EastCentral European area the number of nongovernmental organizations per one million inhabitants is higher -in some even several times more -than in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Except for Georgia and Kazakhstan, where the number of nongovernmental organizations per one million inhabitants is slightly higher than the fi gures for Poland and Romania, the analyzed data are higher compared to the other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Signifi cant diff erences in the data should also be observed. For Russia (2,794 nongovernmental organizations per one million inhabitants) the data are only slightly lower than analogous fi gures for Poland and Romania. However, for Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -297, 360, 21, and 200 respectively -they are at least a dozen or so times lower than the fi gures for Poland and Romania. Similarly, for the Balkan states, apart from Croatia, which joined the European Union on the 1st of July 2013, the dominant tendency is a smaller number of nongovernmental organizations per million inhabitants than in the case of EU member states located in East-Central Europe. Th e "fracture" of Europe with regard to this element of the development of civil society and its empowerment, which is the existence of nongovernmental organizations, is clear.
An important factor in building the empowerment of society and the possibility of its participation in public life is freedom of the media. Th ey are an indispensable condition for the existence of an open, empowered society. Hence, in liberal societies, they are even called the "fourth power" that exercises a controlling function over the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Th e nongovernmental organization Reporters without Borders publishes an annual ranking, also called the Press Freedom Index. It is determined based on surveys, whose main objective is to identify constraints on freedom of the press such as direct attacks on journalists and the media, or any other restrictions on their functioning regardless of whether they are imposed by government or non-governmental structures. Th e result of the survey is the ranking of states from the highest (fi rst position) to the lowest (last position) level of media freedom. In 2013 the survey was held in 179 countries. Th e data pertaining to the countries of East-Central Europe and the neighbouring Commonwealth of Independent States are shown in Table 2 . Th e distinct dividing line runs again between the East-Central European EU member states and non-EU countries. Th e only East-Central European state in the group of non-EU members, which occupies a higher position in the ranking than the lowest positioned EU member states in this part of Europe, is, rather surprisingly, Moldova. In the 2013 ranking it occupied 55t place, ahead of Hungary56t place and Bulgaria -87t. Apart from Moldova the diff erence in ranking positions between Belarus and Ukraine on the one side and EU member states in East-Central Europe is signifi cant. Ukraine ranks 126t and when compared with the year 2012 it has droped by 10 positions, while Belarus ranks 157t, a move upwards by 10 positions. For comparison, the highest position in the ranking among the East-Central European EU member states is occupied by Estonia-11t place, the Czech Republic -16t, Poland -22ⁿd, Slovakia -23rd, Lithuania -33rd, Slovenia -35t, Latvia -39t, and Romania -42ⁿd. 13 When compared with the ranking of the East-Central European EU member states, the CIS states not counted as this part of Europe score signifi cantly poorly. Only Armenia (position 74) and Georgia (position 100) are within the fi rst hundred positions in the media freedom ranking. Most of the Central Asian countries and Russia are in the bottom section of the ranking. Th e latter ranks 148t, Tajikistan -123rd, Azerbaijan -156t, Uzbekistan -164t, and Turkmenistan -177t. 14 Th e post-Soviet area clearly constitutes a space with low standards of media freedom which restricts the empowerment of the societies living there and contribute to the existing 'fracture" of East-Central European space. Another (it seems valuable) measure of political empowerment of societies in East-Central Europe, which at the same time confi rms the "fracture", is Democracy Index. It was developed by the think tank Th e Economist Intelligence Unit from London, and was fi rst applied in 2006. Th is index is used to "measure" the state of democracy in 167 states worldwide. It is determined through surveys and is based on 60 indexes grouped into fi ve categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. 15 Th e maximum number of points denoting the highest level of democracy is 10. Th e lower the number of points, the lower the democracy level is. Four types of democracy are distinguished: full democracies -10 -8 point range; fl awed democracies -7.9 -6; hybrid regimes -5.9 -4; and authoritarian regimes -below 4 points.
Th e data in Table 3 explicitly show that all East-Central European EU member states occupy higher positions in the democracy index ranking than the states in this part of Europe that are not EU members. Out of the latter, Moldova (ranking 67t) and Ukraine (ranking 80t) occupy relatively high positions. Comparatively low positions are occupied by Russia (122) and Belarus (141) . Out of the countries of the post-Soviet area higher positions in the ranking than the last two states are occupied by Georgia (93), Kyrgyzstan (106) and Armenia (114). Lower positions went to Kazakhstan (143), Uzbekistan (161) and also Turkmenistan (161) out of the 167 states classifi ed in the ranking. 16 It should also be emphasized that in the context of the foregoing four types of democracy only the Czech Republic out of the East-Central European EU member states was classifi ed into the group of full democracy states. Th e others were categorized as fl awed democracies. Lower scores were given here for political participation and political culture. However, out of the East-Central European states-non-EU members, only Moldova was categorized as a fl awed democracy. Ukraine given for social participation and political culture, while with regard to Belarus and some Central Asian states the electoral processes and the level of political pluralism were those that scored low and were criticized. Consequently, for all the debatable character and awareness of the imperfections in presenting qualitative phenomena by means of quantitative indicators, the line of "fracture" of Europe in reference to the level of democracy and political empowerment of individual societies runs between the East-Central European EU member states and those that are not EU members. Th erefore, the distinguishable geographical space of East-Central Europe does not constitute a coherent space of common democratic political standards that enable the common understanding and exercise of political empowerment. Studies on the political empowerment of East-Central European societies were also conducted by the American Freedom House foundation. Th e published Report Nations in Transit 2013 analyzes the functioning of civil society and civil liberties and freedoms in 29 states of Central Europe, the post-Soviet area, and in the Balkans. 17 In comparison with Democracy Index analyzed earlier, a diff erent rating scale and measuring scale of the democracy level and functioning of civil society were used. Th is is a scale from 1 -the highest level-to 7 -the lowest level. In the context of this rating scale, fi ve categories of qualities of political systems and their importance for civil liberties were distinguished: consolidated democracies -in the 1.00 -2.99 index range; semi-consolidated democracies-3.00 -3.99; transitional governments/hybrid regimes -4.0 -4.99, semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes-5.00 -5.99, and consolidated authoritarian regimes -6.00 -7.00.
Th e conducted studies provided grounds for a pessimistic estimate of the tendency in the evolution of the democracy level and the functioning of civil societies in the countries surveyed. In 17 out of the 29 states there was a lowering of the indicator, and, consequently, in the level of democratic freedoms and in the conditions for the functioning of civil society; only in 6 states an increase was reported. Th e tendencies of changes do not however explain the general level of democracy and civil liberties in individual countries. Again, as is the case with studies on Democracy Index, there is a clear diving line in the level of democratic standards, which runs fi rst of all between the new EU member states and the Eurasian post-Soviet states. Th is is clearly illustrated in Figure 1 . Th e Balkan states seem to form a characteristic "buff er zone" between the areas in question. Th e new European Union member states, except Bulgaria and Romania, were classifi ed as consolidated democracies. Th e states in the post-Soviet area are characterized by signifi cant diversifi cation in the categories of development of democracy and civil society, or more precisely, by the lack of them. Only Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine were categorized as states in transition. Armenia and Kyrghizia were classifi ed as semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, and the others (Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were categorized as consolidated authoritarian regimes. A large number of these states are obviously not counted as located in the East-Central European area. However, the fact that they were listed clearly shows that the standards of democracy and functioning of civil society in the whole post-Soviet territory signifi cantly diff er from those binding in new EU member states in East-Central Europe and -except for Belarus -the farther away from EU borders, the lower, with some oversimplifi cation, the level of democracy index.
Th e Freedom House foundation Report also reviewed the condition of democratic standards and civil society in each of the particular 29 states. Th e specifi city of the existing problems and restrictions was thus captured. Th e way the dividing line runs in East-Central Europe was again confi rmed. In reference to the post-Soviet area the Report emphasized that the practices of intimidating civil society activists in Russia were used. Similar patterns of action were applied in the neighbouring autocratic states of Russia. In 2012, restrictions on civil society were stepped up in Belarus and Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and in Tajikistan. 18 Th e Report also stressed that in that year the governments of autocratic states in which Ukraine's Democracy Score is rapidly approaching its pre-Orange Revolution level In new EU member states in East-Central Europe the general deterioration of the conditions of the functioning of civil society and its empowerment was also reported. However, the reasons for and ways of manifestation of these constraints are signifi cantly diff erent. It should also be emphasized that the conditions of the functioning of civil societies improved in 3 out of the 10 states. Th e problems and restrictions that occur are varied. In Bulgaria and Poland there was a slight lowering of the level of media freedom. In Slovakia, the independence of the functioning of judicial agencies slightly decreased. Th e lowered Democracy Index in Estonia was caused by the intensifi cation of corruption in 2012. Th e last issue is a vital problem for the other Baltic republics. An increase in the level of civil liberties was reported for the Czech Republic, and, despite corruption practices, for Latvia. 20 An essential element in the analysis of the empowerment of society but also the existing "fracture" in this fi eld in East-Central Europe is the observance of human rights, or more precisely, the restrictions in this fi eld. It should be clearly emphasized that human rights are a vital element of European political identity, and their observance is clearly given precedence before the principle of sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal aff airs. It was recognized that where violations of human rights may be the source of destabilization of the international environ-ment, the states cannot invoke the principle of non-interference in their internal aff airs. 21 However, the practice of observance of human rights in East-Central European countries is the subject of criticism, for example from nongovernmental organizations. 22 In its annual Reports Amnesty International identifi es and criticizes the cases of violation of human rights worldwide, taking the abovementioned group of states into account. Based on the analysis of the Reports for 2009 and 2013 a conclusion can be drawn about diff erent intensity of human rights violations in particular states in this part of Europe. Once again, the clear dividing line, a kind of "fracture", runs between the East-Central European EU member states and those outside of the European Union. In the former the level of observance of human rights standards is higher than in the latter, each state having its specifi c problems.
Th e problems restricting civil liberties and the empowerment of society persist in time, being clearly noticeable. In the case of the Czech Republic the main problem is the discrimination of the Romany community. speech and the right to association and assembly. Th e execution of three death sentences was reported. 32 Ukraine was accused of failure to eff ectively prevent growing racist attacks, of compulsorily sending away refugees and asylum seekers, of the use of torture during police interrogations, and impunity of those responsible for human rights violations. 33 Th e 2013 Report pointed out the use of torture, and impunity of police offi cers for such acts. It emphasized the lengthiness of court proceedings, as well as imprisonment and expulsion of asylum seekers to their countries of origin. 34 In the 2009 Report, Moldova, like Ukraine, was accused of the use of torture and impunity of those responsible for human rights violations. Cases of racial discriminations were not punished. Th e Report also concluded that new regulations concerning freedom of assembly were not enforced. 35 Th e 2013 Report pointed out the use of torture and impunity of police, and discrimination of sexual minorities. 36 Th e analysis of the Amnesty International reports provides grounds for a conclusion that in the East-Central European territory the formal acceptance of human rights standards is not followed by the corresponding practice of their implementation, whose level varies considerably. A clear dividing line, a specifi c "fracture", is found between the EU member states and the post-Soviet states. Specifi c problems with the observance of human rights, mainly in the context of the legacy of recently fi nished wars, are encountered in the Balkan states. With regard to the observance of human rights standards, the East-Central European territory is thus not a uniform, coherent region. Th is is also the case with civil liberties and freedoms and the above mentioned conditions of the functioning of civil society.
THE SPECIFICITY OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE SOCIAL SPACE OF EASTCENTRAL EUROPE
"Socio-economic situation" is a term with a broad content scope and with blurred boundaries. A research challenge, particularly in view of the size of this study, is to comprehensively present the specifi city of the socioeconomic situation in East-Central Europe and the existing divisions. For the purpose of the study, such a comprehensive measure could be the Human Development Index (HDI). It was devised in 1990 by a Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, and since 1993 it is applied by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to prepare annual reports concerning the level of social development worldwide. HDI is a synthetic measure of the development level of society in a particular state, combining social and economic elements. Th e following are assessed: a) Life expectancy at birth b) Mean years of schooling of the citizen in a state, aged 25 years or more, c) Expected years of schooling for children which begin education, d) Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in a state calculated by purchasing power parity. 37 The data in Table 4 clearly show that East Central Europe does not constitute a coherent socio-economic space. Conditions of socio-economic life are highly diversifi ed. Th e dividing line again runs between the EU member states in East-Central Europe and those that are not EU members. Taking into account the overall HDI value and the resultant ranking, only two EU members i.e. Romania and Bulgaria (ranks 56 and 57 respectively) occupy slightly lower positions than the highest ranks of non-EU members in East-Central Europe. Th ese states are Belarus and Russia ranking 50t and 55t respectively. However, regardless of the comparatively high position of Belarus and Russia in the HDI ranks, there are signifi cant diff erences between the other EU member states in East-Central Europe and those East-Central European states that are not EU members. While Slovenia ranks 21st, the Czech Republic 28t, Estonia 33rd, Slovakia 35t, and Poland 39t as well as Lithuania ranks 41st, and Latvia 44t, then Ukraine ranks 78t, and Moldova 113t. Th e positions of other countries of the post-Soviet area are also distant. Kazakhstan ranks 69t, Georgia 72ⁿd, Azerbaijan 82ⁿd, Armenia 87t, Turkmenistan 102ⁿd, and Uzbekistan 114t. 38 Th e existing diff erences and divisions mean that East-Central Europe does not constitute as a comparatively coherent social space. It can be said with some oversimplifi cation but capturing the logic of the situation that the farther away from the European Union boundaries, the more profound the diff erences are. Diff erences also pertain to particular components that make up the synthetic HDI value. Th ey are the least discernible in education. Diff erences between individual states are small and it is diffi cult to speak of a distinct dividing line. Considerable diff erences, however, pertain to life expectancy at birth, the dividing line being distinctly marked. In the new East-Central European EU member states life expectancy is far longer than in the states in this part of Europe that are not EU members. In Slovenia it is 79.5 years, in the Czech Republic 77.8, in Poland 76.3, in Slovakia 75.6, the lowest being in Lithuania 72.5. In Belarus it is 70.6 years, in Ukraine 68.8, in Moldova 69.6, and in Russia 69.1. Life expectancy in the other post-Soviet states is also diversifi ed. Th e longest life expectancy is in Armenia-74.4 years and in Georgia 73.9, and the shortest in Turkmenistan 65.2 and in Kazakhstan 67.4. 39 Th ere are also distinct diff erences and divisions in the sphere of the economic situation of societies in particular states, which are measured by the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, and gauged by purchasing power parity. Admittedly, this income in the two poorest EU states, i.e. in Bulgaria and Romania -11,474 US$ and 11,011 US$ respectively-is lower than this fi gure for Russia -14,461 US$ and Belarus -13,385 US$, the states of the post-Soviet area with the highest GNI. Th is indicator is, nevertheless, sometimes signifi cantly lower than the achievements of the other EU member states in East-Central Europe. In Slovenia it is 23,999 US$, in the Czech Republic-22,067 US$, in US$ for Ukraine, and for Moldova -3,319 US$. In the other post-Soviet states the situation varies, the GNI index being signifi cantly lower than in the East-Central European EU member states. Th e highest values for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are 10,451 US$ and 8,153 US$ respectively, the lowest are in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -2009 US$ and 2119 US$ respectively. 40 When comparing the foregoing disproportions in the income levels per capita, the data concerning the scale of poverty appear surprising just as, consequently do the fi gures showing the range of social stratifi cation. It is more signifi cant and the scale of poverty is larger in the East-Central European EU member states compared to those that are not. In the context of determining the Human Development Index for each state, the UNDP also defi ned the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). Its aim is to show in percentage terms the group of people who encounter diffi culties in access to educational services, health care, and who live in diffi cult fi nancial situations. According to the data contained in the UNDP report for 2013 41 Another index that describes social life in individual states is the Gender Inequality Index (GII). Th e dividing line again runs clearly between the EU member states in East-Central Europe and those that are not EU members. A particularly distinct diff erence pertains to the political empowerment of women measured by their presence in the parliaments of particular states. Th is presence in the parliaments of the East-Central European EU member states-except for Hungary-is signifi cantly higher than the states of the post-Soviet area.
Th e GII index was calculated according to the data for 2012. For example, for Poland GII was 0.14, which ranked 24t out of 148 states surveyed. In Poland 21.8% of parliamentary seats were held by women, 76.9% of adult women received secondary or higher education compared to 83.5% of men. 48.2% of women are economically active compared to 64.3% of men. 50 Th e Czech Republic ranked 20t in this ranking-GII index was 0.122. 21% of MPs were women, and 99.8% of adult women completed at least secondary education. 49.6% of women are economically active compared to 68.2% of men. 51 For Slovakia GII index was 0.171, the state thereby ranking 32ⁿd in the ranking. 17.3% of parliamentary seats went to women. 98.6% of adult women completed at least secondary education compared to 99.1% of men. 51.2% of women are economically active in comparison to 68.1% of men. 52 Th e position of the other East-Central European states and those in the post-Soviet area (the states that are not EU members) is visibly lower in this ranking. Only Romania, ranking 55t, occupied a lower position in the ranking than Moldova -49t, Russia -51st, Kazakhstan -also 51st, and Azerbaijan -54t. In Moldova 19.8% of parliamentary seats were held by women. 91.6% of adult women completed at least secondary education compared to 95.3% of men. In comparison with EU member states in East-Central Europe, the percentage of economically active women was lower (38.4% compared to 45.1% of men). 55 Ukraine ranked 57t. Only 8% of parliamentary seats went to women. 91.5% of adult women received at least secondary education compared to 96.1% of men, while 53.3% of women as compared to 66.6% of men were economically active. 56 Th ere are no data for Belarus.
With regard to the other post-Soviet states: Russia and Kazakhstan equally ranked 51st in the GII ranking. For Russia, GII index was 0.312. In the parliament 11.1% of seats went to women. 93.5% of adult women completed at least secondary education compared to 96.2% of men. 56.3 of adult women are economically active compared to 71% men. 57 In Kazakhstan women held 18.2% seats in the parliament, while 99.3% of adult women completed at least secondary education, 66.6% being eco- 53 Hungary, Country Profi les, Human… 54 Slovenia, Country Profi les, Human Development Indicators, http://hdrstats.undp. org/images/explanations/SVN.pdf.
55 Moldova (Republic of), Country Profi les, Human Development Indicators, http:// hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profi les/MDA.html. 56 Ukraine, Country Profi les, Human Development Indicators, http://hdrstats.undp. org/images/explanations/UKR.pdf.
57 Russian Federation, Country Profi les, Human… nomically active. 58 In Armenia (ranking 59t) 10.7% of parliamentary seats went to women. 94.1% of adult women had at least secondary education, and 49.4% were economically active. 59 In Georgia, ranking 81st in the ranking, 6.6% of seats in the parliament were held by women. Out of the adult ones, 89.7% completed at least secondary education, with 55.8% being economically active. 60
THE SPECIFICITY OF CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE SOCIAL SPACE OF EASTCENTRAL EUROPE*
Just as East-Central Europe does not constitute a separate coherent space of the political empowerment of society, or a space with comparatively uniform socio-economic indicators, so too it does not constitute a space in which there is a distinctly defi ned East-Central-European cultural identity. It should be said that there are many cultural identities rather than one in the geographical area under consideration. Th ey are a dynamic process conditioned mainly by three determinants functioning at the level of the international environment, or, in other words, the international system. 61 Th ese determinants are: the end of the Cold War, processes of European integration, and globalization processes. Combined together, they produce a kind of triple and synergic change at the same time.
Th e foregoing three kinds of systemic determinants-as a form of change of the international environment, mostly with qualitative features 58 Kazakhstan, Country Profi les, Human Development Indicators, http://hdrstats. undp.org/images/explanations/KAZ.pdf.
59 Armenia, Country Profi les, Human Development Indicators, http://hdrstats.undp. org/images/explanations/ARM.pdf.
60 Georgia, Country Profi les, Human Development Indicators, http://hdrstats.undp. org/images/explanations/GEO.pdf. -create new opportunities to mold identities that go beyond the established national and ethnic ties, usually limited by the territory and borders of individual states. Under these circumstances, relationships between the individual identity of persons and the identity of communities, in which these individuals function, acquire a special meaning. Despite the disputable and controversial character of approach, many authors distinguish between collective and individual identity, or between its collective and individual dimension. 62 One cannot fail to notice, however, that the two kinds of identity are interrelated, being a part of an individual's personal, subjective identity. Th e need for a collective identity, i.e. membership of a specifi c community, refl ects characteristic individual striving for identifi cation with larger communities. Th is striving is a manifestation of individual identity and resultant preferences of individuals. Hence, collective identity can be understood as the process of "overlapping" of individual identities. 63 Studying collective identities thus means investigating the problem of dialectics between subjective identity and socially recognized identity. According to Alberto Melluci it is a dynamic construction that serves to assess and interpret reality. 64 It should be remembered that the processes of European integration and the globalization processes, while introducing qualitatively new features into the functioning of the international environment, create grounds for the emergence in EastCentral Europe of new self-identifi cation forms of individual identities, also within communities, that can signifi cantly go beyond the space defi ned by the territories of particular states. Does this lead, however, to the evolvement of a separate East-Central European identity? It seems that the question asked in this way should be answered in the negative. Th e foregoing three kinds of systemic determinants are distinguished by their specifi city and diff erent intensity of impact on the processes of transformation of cultural identity in East-Central Europe and on molding their collective forms. Th e intensity of the impact of the end-of-the Cold War factor is clearly going down, while the intensity of impact of the globalization processes factor is growing. Th e intensity of the integration processes factor varies or is even asymmetrical in reference to the central and eastern part of Central Europe. Th e central part was included in the European Union, the eastern part being left outside of it. Th is contributed to marking off a new dividing life of Europe, with qualitatively new features as compared with the Cold-War Iron Curtain. Nevertheless, regardless of the specifi city of the foregoing determinants and the asymmetry in the intensity of their impacts, the evolution of cultural identity in East-Central Europe is a synergic eff ect of each of these factors. None of them can thus be disregarded in the process of analysis.
One eff ect of the end of the Cold War essential for East-Central Europe was that it initiated the ongoing process of the free fl ow of culture across the former Iron Curtain. Th is is the fulfi llment of Western demands that appeared already during the Cold War under the CSCE process. 65 At that time the West insisted on the free fl ow of culture, making it one of the instruments of political pressure on the East. Th e restrictions existing in the latter stemmed from political and ideological reasons since the Western ideas, values, or patterns of behavior were treated as harmful and destructive: consequently, prevention of their infl ux was interpreted as a way of protecting the national identities of individual states against the infl ux of Western mass culture standards. Th is means that divergent models of cultural policy functioned in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe there was the liberal model of commercialization of culture. In contrast, Eastern Europe applied state control over the fl ow of culture. 66 Aft er 1989 the situation radically changed. Ideological and political divisions disappeared, being replaced by civilizational divisions. Under these circumstances culture is governed by laws of diff usion. It was recognized and politically accepted that there is no alternative to the free fl ow of cultural values, and culture is not a form of moral and political pressure on the East-Central European states as it used to be during the Cold War. 67 Th e free fl ow of culture was a great achievement of the post-Cold War Europe. However, the eff ects were diverse, not only positive. Th e lasting barrier of the civilizational division created obstacles to the free fl ow of culture. A kind of characteristic defensive reaction in East-Central Europe was nationalist tendencies. Th ey can be seen as an "abreaction" to the period of ideological pressure of proletarian internationalism. In the autumn of 1989 Zbigniew Brzeziński wrote about post-communist nationalism as a characteristic form of nationalism, not digested by democratization and tolerance processes. 68 Th is meant that under such circumstances -particularly in the 1990s -the free fl ow of culture and popularization of European values encountered limitations. A characteristic trait of EastCentral Europe became multiculturalism. Under these circumstances the "unfrozen" ethnic problems became a serious political problem, and Western Europe was afraid of the specter of nationalism haunting Europe.
Th e end of the Cold War did not therefore create conditions for the development of a common Central European cultural identity. Furthermore, it appears that particularly in the 1990s there were dominant factors that divided nations and ethnic groups in East-Central Europe in cultural and political terms. One such factor is without doubt the factor of "diffi cult" historical past, functioning in the consciousness of present-day generations. Th e intensity of its infl uence is confi rmed by the fact that reconciliation processes between nations in this part of Europe proved to be far more diffi cult than in Western Europe. While reconciliation between the French and the Germans, and then between the Germans and the Poles took place under the favorable conditions of European integration processes, reconciliation between for example the Poles and the Ukrainians, coming to terms with the legacy of their shared diffi cult history, is taking place under the conditions of the emergence of the new dividing line in Europe-its specifi c "fracture".
Another factor that makes it diffi cult or even impossible for a common East-Central European identity to arise is the historically diverse cultural legacy. Many nations functioned as part of diff erent empires (Russia, Austro-Hungary, Germany, and Turkey), experiencing diff erent, oft en opposing traditions of the functioning of political systems and social organizations. Likewise, the factor of religious divisions into Catholicism and Orthodox Church cannot be ignored, nor can Islamic infl uences that were present and still are. 69 European integration processes, regardless of their asymmetric occurrence in the central and eastern part of East-Central Europe, did not contribute to the formation of a distinct East-Central European identity, because they were accompanied by the idea -despite the above mentioned "fracture of Europe" -of forming a new European identity. Views on the subject are fairly concurrent. Karol Muller expressed an opinion that creating an identity is a way of reducing uncertainty and ambiguity, 70 while Ulrich Beck emphasized that building the European unity has to be perceived as an attempt to consolidate and at the same time to ease European national complexities manifested in the form of a national-ethnic mosaic. 71 Ernest Gillnet, in turn, believed that the transformation of national identities should be seen as a specifi cally understood process of "denationalization" consisting in confi rmation of the cultural dimensions of national identities and in weakening their pathological elements. 72 Th ese views explicitly demonstrate that European identity does not mean the rejection of national identities, while there is a demand that their nationalist "layer" be weakened. Jorgen Hagerman suggested that instead of national identities, which he called "ultimate totalitarianisms", new forms of belonging should be developed in the multinational, multicultural community through multicultural contacts and multiethnic ties. 73 He also off ered a conception of cosmopolitan patriotism.
In the context of earlier remarks, Karol Muller advanced a view that European integration is an opportunity to create a positive identity perceived as a complex process "enlightening" national identities and weakening their negative elements chiefl y manifested in nationalism. A signifi cant role in the process is assigned to civil society. It should create grounds for an open identity, not oversimplifi ed to its nationalist component. It is therefore a process of reconstructing identities existing in Europe, and building a new form of collective identity, which is the European identity. It must not be seen, however, as a national identity. If a European cultural specifi c characteristic is diversity, then the European cultural identity is diffi cult to defi ne in unequivocal terms because it is a "postnational" and "posttraditional" identity. 74 Karol Muller expressed a view that building this form of identity is possible through specifi c methods of multicultural communication, dialog, and participation, in which a signifi cant role is played by civil society. Under these conditions, communication is a way of creating the sense of belonging and solidarity. Societies undergoing modernization are becoming communication societies, which is facilitated by modern technologies and network structures. In this context, the forming of a European identity is a process whose main component is active participation of civil society in open communication which can in itself be a characteristic of European identity. 75 Th is mechanism, despite the asymmetric intensity of occurrence, also creates conditions for the transformation of cultural identity in EastCentral Europe. However, taking into account the earlier analyzed diversity of the development degree and conditions under which civil society is functioning in East-Central Europe, and bearing the existing "fracture" in mind, it is doubtful that the process of European integration should generate the emergence of a separate East-Central European identity.
Th e eff ects of the factor of globalization processes on cultural identity in East-Central Europe are diffi cult to determine in unequivocal terms because, fi rstly, it is diffi cult to determine the impact of these processes on social life as such. Secondly, it is diffi cult to precisely determine the increasing but at the same time diverse, asymmetrical degree of "connection" of the East-Central European societies into globalization processes and their consequent sensitivity and receptivity to these processes.
Th ere are two extreme points of view on the assessment of the eff ects of globalization processes on national identities. On the one hand, they are perceived as a potent force destructive to cultural identity, resulting in the homogenization of cultural contents under the infl uence of Western consumer culture regarded by some even as a kind of cultural imperialism. Th e eff ects are therefore perceived as a powerful "wave" that destroys local identities and leads to the loss of cultural identity. Consequently, it is diffi cult to expect that the eff ects of globalization processes understood in this sense should contribute to distinguishing a separate East-Central European identity.
On the other hand, a view is advanced that despite the potent force of market mechanisms, transnational corporations, and the spread of consumer behavior patterns, the globalization processes do not eliminate cultural identity -on the contrary, they strengthen it. A thesis is even put forward that under such conditions and as a result of a defensive reaction cultural identity is more of a product of globalization processes than their victim. 76 Th is is because identity is perceived as a powerful force of local culture that counterbalances decentralist forces in the capitalist economy under globalization. Identity is a product of a cultural construction maintained by the state measures, in particular by law, the educational system, and the media. Under these conditions the deterritorialized and transnational forces of globalization processes encounter resistance on the part of what is termed "banal nationalism". does not, as shown in the documentation analyzed, create grounds for developing a specifi cally regional -i.e. one with a more than national reach -East-Central European identity. In view of the extreme points of view and the fact of the increasing "connection" of societies in East-Central Europe into globalization processes -through the Internet, satellite television, mobile phones, traveling, network structures of global society, transnational corporations and other mechanisms, there is no doubt that these have become a catalyst for the process of dynamization and change of cultural identity. On the one hand, at the level of consumer behaviors they are clearly seen as homogenized, and the globally functioning patterns created by transnational corporations are adopted. Th is may be a debatable or even risky thesis but it appears diffi cult to perceive the retention of national identity or a specifi c East-Central European identity in consumer behaviors. On the other hand, however, when drinking Coca cola, wearing jeans, having a hamburger at McDonalds, a Hungarian, a Pole, a Ukrainian, a Latvian, or a Slovak are still Hungarian, Polish, Ukrainian, Latvian, or Slovakian. Th is does not make it easier to create a separate East-Central European identity. Th is is the more so because the contemporary culture in East-Central Europe, but also in many other parts of the world, is less and less molded by the local since the local is increasingly molded by the global. 78 Th e Internet and satellite television are a form of penetration of the local by the global. Th e transnational social space and its characteristic network structures create opportunities to mold a collective identity which crosses the territorial boundaries of individual states. At the same time they cause collective identity to become a complex, multi-level phenomenon for the societies in East-Central Europe. Does this multi-level character of identity create a chance for a separate level of East-Central European identity? It appears, however, that under the conditions of the abovediscussed "political, social, and economic fracture" of East-Central Europe this question should be answered in the negative. Consequently, the lack of a common East-Central European cultural identity is the result of divi-sions in other fi elds of social life, and it strengthens these divisions at the same time.
To sum up, it should be explicitly emphasized that the present studies have confi rmed that there is no coherent and separate social space functioning in the defi ned geographical space of East-Central Europe. It has been assumed that this space is a multi-level phenomenon which comprises the level of civil society and its political empowerment, the level of socio-economic situation, and the level of distinct cultural identity. It has been confi rmed that this is a space in which the new division of Europe runs at the level of civil society and at the level of the socio-economic situation of societies, whereas East-Central European identity has not emerged at the level of culture. It is thus a "fractured" space while the existing divisions are becoming consolidated and even deepened under the conditions of the EU-preferred strategy of projects, which is confi rmed by the European Neighbourhood Policy, Easter Partnership, or Black Sea Synergy. Th e cognitive goal of the article has thereby been accomplished, the adopted research hypothesis having been positively verifi ed.
Th e present study -a methodological challenge -has confi rmed the usefulness of the quantitative analysis of selected indicators serving to characterize individual levels of the social space in East-Central Europe in the process of investigating the abovementioned "fracture" of Europe. In particular, this applied to the aspect of civil society and the socioeconomic aspect. Especially noticeable divisions are found at the level of civil society.
SUMMARY
East-Central Europe being distinguished -despite diff erent views -a geographical space does not constitute a distinct and coherent political, economic, social, and cultural space. Changes taking place in contemporary Europe, in particular those associated with integration processes mark a new, specifi c dividing line, diff erent from that during the Cold War. It runs across the geographical, and, consequently, social, political, economic and cultural space of East-Central Europe. It is constructed by both diff erent standards and indicators of social, political and economic life in that part of Europe and the specifi c shape of cultural identity.
Th e research objective of the paper is to identify and analyze the "fracture" of social space in this part of Europe. It is assumed that social space is a complex, multifaceted construction. Especially signifi cant seems to be the problem of the political empowerments of civil society and its limitations, the problem of the socio-economic situation, and the problem of cultural identity. It is also assumed that the EU's political strategy currently being pursued, consisting in relinquishing the prospect of EU enlargement towards the east to include selected countries of the so-called post-Soviet area, contributes to strengthening "the fracture" of East-Central Europe. Th is is apparently the result of the European Union's implementation of "A Europe of Projects" strategy, which is the measures undertaken under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, or Black Sea Synergy.
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